In this paper a methodology to develop safety-critical control systems is proposed. These systems continuously interact with the physical environment, and those admitting at least one failure causing a catastrophe are classified as safety-critical. Our methodology takes into account both the control system (controller) and the physical environment (plant). After the requirements analysis, the system is developed following data flow model, i.e., described as a static data flow network of nodes executing concurrently and communicating asynchronously. The plant is used as the test case for the validation of the controller and their composition is analysed to show whether hazards are reached. To this purpose we apply a transformation from data flow networks to LOTOS specifications. The transformation preserves the semantics of the original network and data flow network properties can be derived and proved on the LOTOS specification using available support tools. A train set example for the contact-free moving of trains on a circular track divided into sections is shown as an application of the methodology.
Introduction
Control systems are computing systems which continuously interact with the physical environment, e.g. traffic control or industrial process control systems. Many control systems are safety-critical, i.e. systems for which at least one failure exists that can cause a catastrophe. Therefore, in addition to their functional capabilities, these systems require specified levels of dependability. In the framework of safety-critical systems, one approach to improve the level of dependability is to use formal specification and verification in conjunction with other methods of software development such as testing and fault tolerance. The analysis of the critical issues of a control system plays a vital role in the development of safety-critical systems. Critical issues address what the system should not do and allow to concentrate on the elimination and control of the hazards. The study of the critical issues of the system, allows us to derive the constraints necessary to guarantee a safe behaviour of the system (safety constraints) and the strategies to realise it (safety strategies) [1] . The validation phase is as important as requirements analysis. Validation is the activity that aims to check that the actual behaviour of the developed system is as expected.
Data flow is a paradigm for concurrent computations. A data flow network is composed by a set of nodes (or processes) all executing concurrently and asynchronously. They communicate by exchanging messages, representing data items, over asynchronous communication channels (following a FIFO policy). The computation proceeds in a data driven manner: a node of the network is ready to execute as soon as the required data tokens are available. Data flow is receiving great attention being known for its suitability for achieving a high degree of execution parallelism, thus allowing to improve performance, but has other useful characteristics as well. A data flow network is usually very close to the intuitive representation of a control system, that is the translation from the conceived system to a data flow graph is straightforward, as well as to inspect the data flow graph to determine which aspects of the system are represented [2] , [3] . This makes data flow generally recognised as a convenient programming paradigm for the development of control systems. The referential transparency property admitted when nodes compute functions, by which two executions of the same node with the same input data produce equal output results, makes data flow "inherently fault tolerant": it is possible to tolerate simple failures by re-evaluating the same function on the same input data [4] , [5] . If a non deterministic behaviour of nodes is allowed, still the strong isolation and information hiding enforces a good confinement useful for setting error confinement areas around modules by means of appropriate consistency checks. The property of composability which puts in direct relation the general behaviour of a system from its constituent parts [6] , [7] helps verification and validation. Lastly, structural models for software reliability assessment can be applied since all data necessary to their use can be obtained by a simple instrumentation of software code [8] .
In this paper a systems development methodology is proposed. After the requirements analysis, the system is developed following the computational model based on the Jonsson's formalism [7] . In the validation phase, the specification of the physical environment is assumed as the test case for the control system: the plant and the controller are composed and the resulting behaviour is analysed to be sure that hazards are never reached in the system. To this purpose, we apply a transformation from data flow networks to LOTOS (Language Of Temporal Ordering Specification) [9] specifications. The transformation maintains the data flow network properties which can be derived and proved on the LOTOS specification. Available LOTOS software support tools are then used [10] . The adequacy of the proposed methodology is shown through the design and the validation of a simple control system: a train set example for the contact-free moving of trains on a circular track divided into sections [1] , [11] . The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the definition of our methodology, including a description of the data flow formalism adopted, the transformation and its properties. Section 3 develops the example of the train set to show how the methodology can be applied. Lastly, Section 4 contains our conclusion.
System Development Methodology
The proposed development methodology takes into account the parallel interaction between a plant and a controller which must eliminate unsatisfactory behaviours of the plant. The interface between the plant and the controller contains sensors and actuators. Sensors detect events in the plant and send signals to the controller. Upon reception of the signals the controller can take actions by issuing appropriate control commands through actuators. The analysis of the critical issues addressing what the system should not do, allow to define the hazards for the system into consideration and their elimination and control. The analysis is performed in two phases: the first phase to identify the real world properties relevant to the critical behaviour of the system and the second phase to specify the system behaviour required at the interface with the environment, i.e. the sensors and actuators. Thus the constraints necessary to guarantee a safe behaviour of the system (safety constraints) and the strategies to realise it (safety strategies) may be derived.
Then the system realising the safety strategy is developed following a data flow computational model. Since we shall use the specification of the physical environment as the test case for the control system in the validation, we shall model also the plant. As previously mentioned we adopt the formalism for the specification of data flow network proposed in [7] in which the semantics of the networks is based on traces. Here we give some definitions and a brief explanation on this model. Given a data flow network N, let V be the set of data items exchanged over the channels. We denote by V* the set of finite sequences on V and by <> the empty sequence.
Definition:
A data flow node P is a tuple <I P , O P , S P , s 0 P , R P , FAIR P > where: I P is the set of input channels; O P is the set of output channels with (I P ∩O P ) = ∅; S P is the set of states; s 0 P is the initial state, s 0 p∈S P ; R P is the set of firings. A firing F is a tuple F=<s, χ in , s', χ out > where s, s'∈S P , χ in is a mapping from I P to V* and χ out is a mapping from O P to V*. FAIR P ⊆ P (R P ) is a finite collection of fairness sets. If FAIR P =R P , then the node executes firings until no more data are present on the input channels. ♦ For the sake of this paper, the meaning of a firing <s, χ in , s', χ out > can be assumed as follows: when the node is in state s and for each input channel inp∈I P the sequence χ in (inp) is a prefix of the content of the channel (i.e. the firing is executable), then these sequences may be consumed, while the node changes its state to s' and the sequence χ out (out) is produced on each output channel out∈O P . Note that the empty sequence <> is a prefix of each sequence of data.
A data flow network N consists of a set P N of data flow nodes such that in P N each channel occurs at most once as an input channel and at most once as an output channel. The network is obtained connecting input channels to output channels with the same name and a network transition can be generated by the firing of a node or by a communication event, where a communication event can be either an input event or an output event. Communication events occur when a data item is inserted (removed) into (from) an input (output) channel of the network. C N denotes the set of all the channels of the network. A computation of the network is a sequence of transitions of the network. Informally a computation of the network is a complete run of the network in which all nodes perform firings according to their definition and all channels behaves like unbounded FIFO channels. The semantics of the network is the set of its traces; a trace represents the interleaving of the communication events during a computation.
The use of information about the presence/absence of data items and the data driven asynchronous execution of data flow nodes in data flow networks, make reasoning about these networks and their semantics very difficult. To perform the semantic analysis of data flow networks, we apply a transformation from data flow networks to process algebras specifications using the LOTOS formal specification language [9] . LOTOS represents recent work on the combination of CCS (with some extension) [12] to describe the behaviour of the system and an algebraic formalism for the definition of data types. Software support tools have been developed allowing the simulation, the compilation and the proof of properties of a LOTOS specification [10] .
The transformation is obtained by mapping each node and each channel of the network into a process in the process algebras and then all the processes are composed in parallel with synchronisation on the proper set of actions to realise the global behaviour of the network [13] . The names of gates in the specification are directly derived from the names of the channels. For each channel "a"∈C N , "a#" is the gate corresponding to get a data from the channel "a" while "a" is the gate corresponding to put a data on the same channel "a". Let CP be the process which simulates the behaviour of a channel "a" of N (CP behaves like a FIFO buffer) and nodeP be the process that realises the behaviour of the data flow node P, the specification of the network is where Cgates N are the gates corresponding to get (put) from (onto) the whole sets of channels of N, Egates N are the gates corresponding to get (put) from (onto) the input (output) external channels of N. Furthermore, the notation I P # (O P ) is used to denote the set of "a#" ("a") gates for the input (output) channels of the node P. The set of processes associated to channels execute disjoint actions, so they are put in parallel with an empty set of synchronisation gates (||| operator). The same applies to the set of processes associated to the nodes. These two sets of processes synchronise on the set of all the actions defined for the two behaviour expressions. The network specification has the same behaviour of the original data flow network and the formal verification methods of the process algebras can be applied to prove properties of the original network. Interested readers may find more details on the transformation itself and a prove that the transformation preserves the data flow network properties, i.e., the LOTOS specification has the same behaviour of the network from which it has been derived, in [13] . The previous transformation is defined for a class of data flow networks in which the firings of the nodes do not require sophisticated synchronisation mechanisms between the processes associated to the channels and the processes which simulates the behaviour of the nodes. The transformation for general networks is described in [14] .
To summarise, our methodology is based on:
• modelling the physical environment as a part of the overall system (plant) ;
• executing the requirements analysis for both the mission and the critical issues of the system; • specifying safety constraints and a safety strategy for the system to eliminate hazards; • developing the control system in the data flow computational model;
• applying the transformation to the data flow specification of the system (both the control system and the plant) obtaining a LOTOS specification which maintains all the relevant properties (and doing some expression transformation if necessary for their automatic analysis); • verifying the correct behaviour of the system composed by the plant and the controller through an automatic analysis of the LOTOS resulting expression using the available tools.
The Train Set Example
The train set example consists of a simple control system for the contact-free moving of trains on a circular track [1] , [11] . Suppose to have one directional moving of two trains on a circular track divided in six sections, with the constraint that trains are less than one section in length. Hazardous states are the states in which a train may be involved in a collision. In our system, a state is hazardous if the front of one train is in the same or adjacent section as the front of another train. They are avoided in a system if the following condition (safety condition) always holds: the heads of the trains differ at least by 2 sections. The concept of reserved section is introduced and our safety strategy is based on: 1) a section can be reserved by only one train; 2) for any train the section of the front of the train and the section behind must be reserved; 3) a train must always reserve a section before entering it. We use Θ and ⊕ to represent the operation of subtraction modulo 6 and the operation of addition modulo 6, respectively.
We divide the system under development into the physical plant and the controller which communicate by sending control signals and then we apply the data flow model based on the Jonsson's formalism [7] . The plant is composed by six sections {Sect 0 , ..., Sect 5 } shown in Figure 1 (a) . In each section a sensor detects a train entering in the section and an actuator has the task to stop a train before leaving the section when necessary. We model the flow of the train by messages sent by one section to the next (channel sn i ). On receipt of this message the section sends a signal to the controller to notify the passage of a train (channel es i ). Then before the train is allowed to move on the section, it waits for a message from the controller with the meaning that the train is allowed to leave the section (channel go i ). On receipt of this message, the section sends a message to the next section in the circular track to simulate the movement of the train (channel sn i⊕1 ). The CNT i node, after having received a signal from section Sect i that a train has arrived (channel es i ), sends a signal to RES iΘ2 to mark section Sect iΘ2 as free (channel V iΘ2 ), and then it tries to book the section (i⊕1) for the train sending a signal to RES i⊕1 (channel P i⊕1 ). CNT i waits for a positive answer from RES i⊕1 (the next section has been reserved) (channel ok i⊕1 ); and then it sends a signal to Sect i for allowing the train to leave section Sect i (channel go i ). Each RES i node controls the status of the corresponding section which can be reserved for one train or free. It receives signals from the CNT iΘ1 (channel P i ) and reserves the section by sending an acknowledgement (channel ok i ). After the section has been reserved it accepts only a signal through the channel V i to free the section before accepting (and making) any further reservation. The resulting data flow network N, composed by the controller and the plant, is shown in Figure 1 . Let A and B be natural numbers representing the identifiers for the trains running over the track, we suppose an initial state with train A in section Sect 1 and train B in section Sect 5 ; it follows that the sections 1 and 0 (for train A) and the sections 5 and 4 (for train B) must be reserved. The initialisation is used to define the initial state of the data flow nodes. For those communications which are signals we associate the dummy value 1 in defining of the firings of the nodes (another way is to allow any data value). The definition of the data flow nodes is: To apply the transformation we specify the maximum size of the channels which may be assumed equal to two, while the signal communications can be transformed in pure synchronisation action in LOTOS. We give here the LOTOS process definition for the single data flow nodes obtained applying the transformation described in Section 2. The process definitions for the Sect, CNT and RES nodes and that for the CP which simulates a FIFO buffer of length two are: Since LOTOS specifications belonging to the subset of LOTOS without data (basic LOTOS) can be completely analysed by the verification tools, while for specifications with data values we can only simulate and/or compile and run them, we will restrict ourselves to basic LOTOS whenever possible without loosing properties. The LOTOS behaviour analyser AUTO [15] , allows us to build the automaton of a basic LOTOS specification to prove strong and weak bisimulation between specifications. Although it fails when running on large specifications, simple ones like ours can be successfully run and the LOGIC CHECKER tool [16] can be used to prove action-based logic formulas ACTL, over the specification. To this purpose we make some manipulations of the specification obtained directly by the data flow to LOTOS transformation, trying to synchronise processes and to hide actions as soon as possible. This allows AUTO to reduce the number of the states during the generation of the automaton of the specification. The LOTOS "Regrouping Parallel Processes" correctness preserving transformation can be applied automatically by the LOTOS structure editor to regroup processes differently. The transformation preserves the strong bisimulation equivalence. All the previous tools are included in the LOTOS integrated tool environment Lite [10] developed inside the LOTOSPHERE ESPRIT project. Since all the nodeSect, nodeCNT and nodeRES processes execute all the actions in state s and then the actions in the state s' (nodeSect executes actions either in s a or s b ) before repeating, we assume s as the initial state and rewrite the processes as: We can now map our specification into basic LOTOS. Lite, provides many mappings from a full LOTOS specification onto a basic LOTOS one. They differ for the data value information that are removed. We can apply the simplest transformation named "trans_np0" where all data are dropped, keeping simply the original gate identifiers as basic LOTOS actions. The transformation can be directly invoked by the behaviour analysis menu entry. In order to apply this mapping without loosing information, we modify the specification defining one gate for train A and another one for train B when they run over the track (i.e. substituting each action sn i with two actions asn i and bsn i ). The new process nodeSect is simply a non deterministic choice between the actions corresponding to the passage of the two trains. This is the only communication channel where data are important, in all the others the value of the data are not significant and can be dropped. The behaviour expression of the whole specification of the system is reported in the Appendix; where the observable actions are the actions corresponding to the movement of the trains over the track (gates asn i # and bsn i #). Note that there are not external channels of the network and the set of processes associated to the nodes must synchronise with the set of channel processes on the whole set of gates. The LOTOS behavioural analyser AUTO can be run over the specification allowing to easily prove our safety strategy. The automaton (considering the weak bisimulation equivalence) has 18 states and 24 transitions and it is deadlock free. We proved automatically, by using the LOGIC CHECKER over the automaton, the following logic formulas to be true for train A: The same formulas can be proved to be true for the train B. From these we have that when train A is in section i, train B is never in section iΘ1, i, i⊕1. This holds also for train B, thus satisfying the safety condition.
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Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a methodology which can be used for the design of safety-critical systems and for the validation of the design. Quite apart the modelling of the physical environment as a part of the overall system which can be used as test case for the control system, the use of the data flow computational model for the description of the system specification allows the designer to use notations which are very natural and which can be made even more user friendly by the use of development tools like a graphical editor [4] . The transformation into process algebras specification allows the use of the analysis tools available in LOTOS, making the entire process from specification to verification and validation fully automated. The proposed approach has been applied to a simple control system where advantage could be taken by the use of the basic LOTOS tools like the behavioural analyser AUTO for the generation of the automaton and the LOGIC CHECKER. The extension of the proposed approach to the validation of control systems LOTOS specifications with data value involves the use of the simulator tool [10] and the compiler available in the full LOTOS environment, which allows to derive the possible traces of execution of the original data flow network. This extension is anyway limited by the fact that tracing the behaviour of a general network may be very lengthy and unfeasible in case of infinite input sequences. Nevertheless for control systems where the possible input sequences are constrained either on data value or on periodicity, the proposed approach can be used for problems of larger size than that presented in this paper.
